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"50 JAHRE GRUNDGESETZ"
KONFERENZ DER DRAGER- STIFTUNG
1O.-12 JUNI 1999 IN
WARRENTON, VIRGINIA, USA:
COMMENT ON THE REPORT BY
PROFESSOR DR. DONALD P. KOMMERS
Professor Dr. Helmut Steinberger*
MR. Chairman,
Sehr verehrte Frau Prdisidentin des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,
Honorable Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
Ladies and gentlemen:
Let me first express my appreciation to the Driger Foundation for hav-
ing organized this conference in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of
the Basic Law. We meet again in the United States, indeed a very appro-
priate place to do so.
We will probably hear a lot about a success story of the Basic Law, but
may I assure our American friends that we Germans are very well aware
that this story would have looked quite different if the Federal Republic
of Germany would not have enjoyed over these fifty years the constant
support by the United States, first economically via the Marshall Plan,
which helped to bring about the so-called "economic miracle" in Ger-
many, then by the political-military alliance, which until today has effec-
tively protected our freedom, and last but not least, by her support of our
quest for German reunification. For all of this we are and will be sin-
cerely grateful.
From the excellent survey Professor Kommers' has given us on the de-
velopments of the Basic Law, I will-for reasons of time-just single out
one issue which in my opinion is of far-reaching importance: the influence
in recent decades of European integration on the federal system estab-
lished by the Basic Law and its relations to other fundamental constitu-
tional structures. 2
* Justice (retired) Federal Constitutional Court; professor, University of Heidelberg,
Germany.
1. See Donald P. Kommers, Kann das deutsche Verfassungsrechtsdenken Vorbild far
die Vereinigten Staaten sein? 37 DER STAAT 335 (1998).
2. From general literature, see, for example, HUBERT SCHROEDER, DIE
EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT UND DIE LANDER DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
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European integration and German reunification have put federalism,
as established by the Basic Law, on trial. Federalism is an expression of
German political and cultural traditions and values. It is far more than
mere administrative decentralization, vertical separation of powers, or an
expedient organizational structure; it is rather a flexible design to pre-
serve the identities and multiplicity of various entities and to integrate
them into a pluralistic political system. We can see how deeply rooted
federalism is from the fact that when the first Uinder or state constitu-
tions were adopted in Southern Germany-years before the Basic Law of
1949-they already considered the respective Linder as constituent state
entities of a future German federation. And when in 1989 the Commu-
nist regime in the German Democratic Republic was ousted by a peaceful
revolution, almost overnight the old state symbols of the former tradi-
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tional states were seen in public, e.g., the red eagle of Brandenburg, and
the green-white flag of Saxony. Upon their accession to the Basic Law in
1990, they re-established themselves as states of the Federal Republic.
For decades, a continuous debate on reforming German federalism has
been going on. The main concern has been the ever-increasing trend to-
wards more unitarian structures, caused, in particular, by the implications
of the principles of the "social state" and social legislation. I may, for
example, refer to the issue of provisions for the millions of widows and
surviving dependants of the war victims, for the twelve million people
driven from their homes in the eastern territories of the former Reich,
from Czechoslovakia-3.5 millions alone from there-Poland, Hungary,
and Yugoslavia by the whole ethnic purification of the time, and seeking
refuge in West Germany. You could not establish the social network at
different levels varying from land to land but had to establish a uniform
federal level.
The main issues of this reform debate over the last decades have in-
volved the financial provisions of the Basic Law-obviously a core ele-
ment of each and every federal constitution. In particular, the debate
involved reforming the interlinked system of apportioning revenues and
expenditures between the federation and the Linder, which in 1969 had
replaced the principal system of separation. Other important considera-
tions have been the issue of financial equalization as between the Lander
by re-orientation of its allocative and distributive goals, reforms in the
area of the so-called "Joint tasks," 3 the system of mixed financing, of
granting more taxation powers to the Linder, involving another transfer
of federal legislative powers to them beyond the result brought about by
the constitutional amendment of October 1994. Whether the replacement
of the soft clause of Article 72, section 2, number 3 by the new "neces-
sity" clause of Article 72, section 2 will result in reducing the federation's
use of its concurrent legislative powers is yet to be determined. We will
also have to see whether the Land legislatures will resort to the new norm
control procedure available now for such a purpose.4
I.
Turning to the effects of European integration on the German federal
system, one has to start from the original text of Article 24, section 1,
which in December of 1992 was replaced by the new Article 23.
Article 24, section 1 authorized the transfer to international organiza-
tions of sovereign powers of the federation as well as of the Lander. Al-
though such transfers might have changed the allocation of these powers
as prescribed in the constitution, no constitutional amendment was re-
quired for such transfer of powers, provided, according to decisions of the
Federal Constitutional Court, that such transfers did not surrender the
3. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 91a-b (F.R.G.).
4. See GG art. 93, § 1, no. 2a.
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identity of the Basic Law by undermining its essential structures, such as
the principles underlying fundamental rights and liberties.5
II.
A. From the very beginning, the States have realized the possible di-
minishing effect on their status that any transfer of their substantial pow-
ers would eventually bring about, and might result in a further pull
towards unitarian solutions draining more and more of their powers. Of
particular concern to them, for example, were the financial implications
of such transfer and of consequent measures of the Community. Under
the German Constitution the Federation and the States, as a rule, shall
separately finance the discharge of their respective responsibilities insofar
as the Basic Law does not otherwise provide.6
In addition to clarification of the financial consequences, the States
pursued four aims:
(1) to receive sufficient and prompt information in matters of Euro-
pean integration covering the Community level as well as the fed-
eral level;
(2) to participate in the decision-making process at the federal level;
(3) to participate, possibly, in the decision-making process at the Com-
munity level, and
(4) to adopt a domestic legal instrument formalizing the roles of the
Federation and the States in these matters.
In the context of Germany's constitutional framework, it turned out that
these requests could only be made operational in practice if channeled
through the Federal Council. The Federal Council is a federal organ, rep-
resenting the States, composed of members of their governments, with
voting powers roughly allocated according to their respective
populations.
The States, nevertheless, have established coordinating bodies as
among themselves, such as the Conferences of their prime ministers and
of their ministers of various departments (cultural affairs, justice, trans-
port, etc.). After the EU-Treaty entered into force, they established the
Conference of their Ministers for European Affairs, where the political
practice is to work out their opinions and attitudes within the Federal
Council by unanimous consent. The Federal Council, on the other hand,
makes its decisions by majority rule. There exist, moreover, at various
levels, hundreds of common bodies composed of federal and State execu-
tives as well as interstate bodies engaged in activities such as consulting,
planning, etc. These common bodies are the very fraternities or brother-
hoods of parallel departments constantly consulting and communicating
with each other, as their daily bread.
5. See, e.g., BVerfGE 37, 271 (279); BVerfGE 58, 1 (30); BVerfGE 73, 339.
6. See GG art. 104(a).
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B. After the entry into force of the Treaty on the European Coal and
Steel Community, cooperation between the Federation and the States
started on the level of information. The Federal Government, according
to Article 53 of the Basic Law, has a general obligation to keep the Fed-
eral Council informed about the conduct of its affairs.
Article 2 of the federal law of July 27, 1957, consenting to the Treaties
of Rome, specified this as a continuous obligation with respect to the de-
velopments within the Councils of Ministers of both communities-a pro-
vision which is still in operation. Up to the present time, there are about
600 topics per year on the agenda of the Federal Council in matters of
European integration, amounting to roughly one third of its business.
Also in 1957, the Federal Council established its Special Committee on
European Integration which considers legislative projects of the commu-
nities. It became a permanent committee of the Federal Council in 1965.
Since January 1967, this flow of information has been supplemented by
biannual integration reports by the Federal Government to be discussed
within this Committee.
Between 1963 and 1986, both sides at various occasions undertook con-
sultations to coordinate and harmonize their interests in representing
German positions on the community level. These efforts culminated in
the Federal Chancellor's letter of September 1979 to the States, accepted
by their prime ministers, assuring them that the Federation in matters
concerning the exclusive legislative powers of the States will endeavor to
come to agreed positions, to try to submit these to the fullest extent possi-
ble in negotiations or deliberations on the community level, and to get
them accepted there. The Federation would deviate from the position of
the States only for peremptory compelling reasons of integration policy
and would inform the states of its reasons for doing so in such matters.
The Federation, upon request by the States, would include two agents of
the States within the German representation at the deliberating bodies of
the EC-Commission or Council.
This accord has been acted upon since 1980. In 1986, on the occasion
of the Federal Council's assent to the law approving the Single European
Act, the States requested the formalization of this procedure by law.
There were, nevertheless, serious constitutional controversies even within
the States, in particular on the question of whether the functions of the
Federal Council in this context could be delegated to its Committee on
European Integration without amending the Constitution. While such a
solution was not as yet provided for in the law on the Single European
Act, it did formalize the practice agreed upon since 1979. It was, moreo-
ver, specified by a formal agreement of December 17, 1987, between both
sides.
III.
The most recent step in the attempt to coordinate and harmonize fed-
eral and state policy on European integration was taken on the occasion
2000]
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of the approval of the Treaty establishing the European Union by federal
legislation of February 2, 1992.
This was accomplished primarily by amending the Basic Law. The
main amendments are the following, and most of them are contained in
Article 23:
1. With a view to establishing a united Europe ... Germany shall par-
ticipate in the development of the European Union, which is committed
to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal principles as well as the
principle of subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights compara-
ble in substance to [the protection] afforded by [the] Basic Law. 7
This has been called the "structural clause," meaning that Germany has a
constitutional obligation to participate only in a European Union which
follows these principles. To this end, the Federation may transfer sover-
eign powers by law, which requires the assent of the Federal Council.
2. "The establishment of the European Union as well as amendments
to its statutory foundations and comparable regulations which amend or
supplement the content of [the] Basic Law or make such amendments or
supplements possible shall [require the assent by law corresponding to
constitutional amendments]." 8 That is, the Basic Law requires the assent
of a two-thirds majority in both the Federal Parliament and the Federal
Council. The so-called "eternity clause" 9 must not be encroached upon
thereby. Moreover, Article 50, which defines the general functions of the
Federal Council, has been amended to require state participation through
the Federal Council in matters concerning the European Union. This
makes it clear that state participation will be channelled formally through
the Federal Council. The Federal Government shall inform the Federal
Council (and the Federal Parliament) comprehensively and promptly on
matters concerning the European Union.
3. "The [Federal Council] shall be involved in the decision-making pro-
cess of the Federation in so far as it would have to be involved in a corre-
sponding internal measure or in so far as the [States] would be internally
responsible."' 0
4. Where in an area in which the Federation has exclusive legislative
jurisdiction the interests of the [States] are affected or where in other
respects the Federation has the right to legislate, the Federal Government
shall take into account the opinion of the [Federal Council]. Where es-
sentially the legislative powers of the [States], the establishment of their
authorities or their administrative procedures are affected, the opinion of
7. GG art. 23, § 1.
8. Id.
9. See GG art. 79, § 3.
10. GG art. 23, § 4.
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the [Federal Council] shall be given due consideration in the decision-
making process of the Federation; in this connection the responsibility of
the Federation for the [Federal Republic of Germany] as a whole shall be
maintained. In matters which may lead to expenditure increases or reve-
nue cuts for the Federation, the approval of the Federal Government
shall be necessary.11
5. When legislative powers exclusive to the States are essentially af-
fected, the exercise of the rights belonging to the Federal Republic of
Germany as a Member state of the European Union shall be delegated to
a representative of the States designated by the Federal Council. "Those
rights shall be exercised with the participation of and in agreement with
the Federal Government; in this connection the responsibility of the Fed-
eration for the [Federal Republic of Germany] as a whole shall be
maintained." 12
For matters concerning the European Union, the Federal Council may
form (and has done so already) a Chamber for European Affairs whose
decisions shall be considered as decisions of the Federal Council itself. In
this chamber, as it is with the normal procedures of the Federal Council,
each State shall have at least three votes: States with more than two mil-
lion inhabitants shall have four; those with more than six million inhabi-
tants, five; and those with more than seven million inhabitants, six votes.
The votes of each State may be cast only as a block vote and only by
members present or their alternates.
Details regarding the provisions of Article 23, sections 4 and 6 shall be
subject of a law requiring the assent of the Federal Council.
IV.
From the detailed implementation of this constitutional amendment by
the law of March 12, 1993, on the cooperation between the Federation
and the States in matters of the European Union, let me single out a few
elements.
Before determining internally the German position for negotiations at
the level of the European Union, the Federal Government shall give the
Federal Council in good time an opportunity to state its opinion insofar
as interests of the States are concerned.
Where the Federal Council would have to be involved in a correspond-
ing domestic measure, or where the States internally would be responsi-
ble, the Federal Government has to include representatives of the States
nominated by the Federal Council in the internal deliberations for deter-
mining the German negotiating position.
If the interests of the States are involved in areas of the Federation's
exclusive or concurrent legislative powers, the Federal Government is re-
11. GG art. 23, § 5.
12. GG art. 23, § 6.
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quired to take into account the position of the Federal Council when de-
termining the German negotiating position on the Union level.
If a project at the Union level in its central points concerns the internal
legislative powers of the States, and the Federation does not dispose of
legislative powers in this area or the project seriously concerns the estab-
lishment of State authorities or their administrative procedures, then the
opinion of the Federal Council shall be controlling in determining the
German negotiating position by the Federal Government if attempts to
harmonize the respective positions have been abortive and the Federal
Council's opinion has been taken by a two-thirds majority vote. Even in
such cases, however, the Federal Government may deviate from the Fed-
eral Council's position for the sake of preserving its responsibility for the
Federal Republic as a whole ("gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung") includ-
ing questions of foreign, defense, and integration policies.
Before assenting to projects to be based on Article 235 of the EEC-
Treaty, the Federal Government has to ensure the agreement of the Fed-
eral Council as far as its consent under domestic law will be required or
the States internally are competent.
With regard to Union projects in which the Federal Council would
have to participate in a corresponding domestic measure, or the States
would be internally competent, or their essential interests will be other-
wise concerned, the Federal Government on request shall include repre-
sentatives of the States, to the extent possible, in the German
representation at the negotiations within the consultative bodies of the
European Commission or Council. The conduct of the negotiations on
the German side lies with the Federal Government; with its consent the
representatives of the States may convey statements in the negotiations.
With regard to Union projects vitally affecting exclusive legislative
powers of the States, the Federal Government shall assign the task of
conducting Germany's negotiations within the consultative bodies of the
EU-Commission or Council and in meetings of the EU-Council in its
composition of the ministers of the EU-Member States, to a representa-
tive of the German States. The exercise of the rights by this representa-
tive shall be performed under participation of and in harmony with the
representative of the Federal Government. This procedure will not apply
for rights which Germany holds in presiding over the Council of
Ministers.
The law on cooperation of March 12, 1993, does not cover areas deal-
ing with the common foreign and security policies of the European
Union. There is some controversy between the Federal Government and
the States as to whether it will apply to the so-called "mixed decisions" by
the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member
States assembled in the Council.
Under Article 8 of the law of March 12, 1993, the States may maintain
with the institutions of the European Union permanent communication
bureaus, not enjoying diplomatic status.
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The law of March 12, 1993, moreover, has been supplemented by a
formal agreement of October 29, 1993, between the Federal Government
and the Governments of the German States.' 3
V.
The EEC-Treaty in Article 198 provides for the Committee of the Re-
gions, as is well known. The initiative for its establishment was taken by
the German Government following an outspoken desire by the German
States. Through the Committee of the Regions certain categories of re-
gional and local territorial bodies of the Member States for the first time
have obtained the institutionalized opportunity to represent their inter-
ests in the deliberative processes of the European Union. Of particular
relevance here will be such things as regulation of the structural funds,
the establishment of a cohesion fund, the implementation of regional
funds, the building of European networks, and the promotion and sup-
port of projects of general education, culture, and health. The Commit-
tee may issue consultative opinions on its own initiative in matters where
it considers such action appropriate. 14 Its opinions are, as is well known,
not binding, whereas the German states had preferred a representative
body empowered to participate in binding decision-making processes of
the Community.
The German Law on Cooperation of March 12, 1993, mentioned
before, provides that with regard to projects of the European Union, the
right of municipalities and their associations to regulate matters of the
local communities shall be observed and their interests shall be protected.
For their representation in the Committee of the Regions, the Federal
Government shall propose to the EU-Council of Ministers the persons to
be nominated by the States. The States ensure that the three representa-
tives shall be elected on the proposal of the head Associations of the local
communities.
VI.
In view of the aims and efforts of the German States to participate in
the deliberative and decision-making processes at the Federal as well as
at the Community level (within the respective German representation), it
is no surprise that they have urged the Federal Government to try to
insert into the Treaty on the European Union the "principle of sub-
sidiarity", which on British and German initiatives was indeed adopted at
Maastricht. While this is not the place to dive into the depths of this
principle, its judicial interpretation and application by the Court of Jus-
tice eventually will become decisive and controlling. Its justiciability, ex-
pressly agreed upon by the Council of Edinburgh of December 1992, the
Interinstitutional Agreement of October 25, 1993, and in the Protocol on
13. Bundesanzeiger no. 226, Dec. 2, 1993.
14. See EEC Treaty art. 198c.
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the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality at-
tached to the Treaty of Amsterdam of October 2, 1997, may turn out to
be a very thorny task. I trust that the Court will find its appropriate crite-
ria and standards-bearing in mind also that within an ever-closer union
among the peoples of Europe "decisions are taken as closely as possible
to the citizens."' 5
It has been estimated that more than 100 regulations of the European
Community would not have passed the test of the principle of sub-
sidiarity. The German Federal Constitutional Court has stated that the
Federal Government will have to exert its influence in respecting this
principle. The German inder, nevertheless, will not be able to derive
via the principle of subsidiarity new competences of their own.
VII.
The development of European integration undoubtedly has diminished
the legislative powers of the States, while it has strengthened the position
of the Federal Council with regard to the position of the State Govern-
ments within contemporary German federalism. This has seriously af-
fected its balance of powers. The States have tried to compensate for this
loss by endeavouring, as I tried to point out before, and by gaining a
voice in the deliberative and decision-making processes at the Federal
and EU-levels. The losers of this development undoubtedly were the
state parliaments. Will their representatives in the future just be part-time
or even leisure-time parliamentarians?
That is why some observers speak of today's executive federalism. The
essence of German federalism, whether it is called cooperative, competi-
tive, executive federalism or whatever, is the continuous attempt to pre-
serve the political and cultural identity of the state entities of the
Federation, and to infuse the wealth of ideas of sixteen states into the
political process, competitive as they may be, undoubtedly with possibili-
ties to delay, to block and even to obstruct decisions and policies at the
federal level. The Federal Republic's vitality, nevertheless, rests on the
inder and their peoples. Its political process is characterized by a high
degree of interpenetration and interlocking of the political and societal
levels of the Federation and the States. It is a flexible system of distribut-
ing political power and a device to settle political conflicts through legally
ordered procedures which up to now has provided remarkable stability.
In the reform debate, mentioned before, passionate as it is, with a case on
the financial equalization issue pending before the Federal Constitutional
Court, no voice is heard to abolish federalism in favour of a unitary politi-
cal system.
In comparing Italy and Germany, Romano Prodi, the new President of
the Commission of the European Community, very recently has called
them the countries of "the thousand cities," alluding to the wealth of
15. Compare TEU tit. 1, art. A § 2 and art. B § 2, with EC Treaty art. 3b § 2.
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their traditional cultural multiplicity, adding that it must be the task of
the Political Union to reaffirm, not to destroy, these values.
They are part of Europe's cultural heritage. Article 6 of the EU-Treaty
in the version of the Treaty of Amsterdam providing that the Union shall
be based on the common principles of liberal democracy and the rule of
law respecting the national identity of the Member States should furnish
the political and legal foundations for maintaining this heritage.
504 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
